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THE SOVIET MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS
by

WILLIAM J. SPAHR

The 24th Congress of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union, held in Moscow 30
March - 8 April 1971, ratified the broad
course the Party will take in directing the
Soviet State for the next five years.
Because of the secrecy surrounding the
Soviet Party/government process, in order to
develop a model of the current Soviet military
decisionmaking process, it is necessary to
utilize historical analogies, organizational
symmetries, and assumptions that certain
i n s t i t u t i o n s have retained traditional
functions. The model, which is admittedly an
approximate one, has the virtue of being
derived solely from Soviet experience and
avoids assumptions that Soviet methods
merely mirror those of other countries.
Among Soviet military institutions, the
General Staff has remained relatively stable
since it emerged in its present form in 1942.

schools in that city he was appointed to the United
States Military Academy. On graduation in June 1943
he was awarded the degree of Bachelor of Science in
Civil Engineering and was commissioned in the United
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States Embassy in Moscow, he
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As the planning and executive agency of the
Ministry of Defense, it is intimately involved
in the decisionmaking process. Because it has
been permitted to emerge from obscurity in
recent years, memoirs of former Chiefs of
Staff and descriptions of its operations have
been published which provide a framework
for constructing a decisionmaking model.
The General Staff in its present form was
developed under Stalin, and it was tarred with
the same brush by Khrushchev during his
de-Stalinization campaign. While attacking
Stalin, Khrushchev allowed some light to be
shed on the decisionmaking process which
prevailed during the Stalin period, but the
dictator himself was depicted as being
arbitrary and ill-informed. A considerable
amount of criticism was also directed
specifically at those who helped Stalin
conduct the war-his representatives at the
front and the General Staff.
In preparing these criticisms, Khrushchev
found and encouraged support from the
wartime field commanders, particularly after
Marshal G. K. Zhukov was removed from his
government and party posts in 1957.
After Khrushchev was himself relieved of
his positions in 1964, the current political
leadership, in an effort to "objectify" the
image of Stalin, permitted the publication of
detailed memoirs of some of the military men
who worked in the highest levels of command
before, during, and after World War II.
Generally, they have described Stalin as a
more rational leader than the one presented in
the revelations of Khrushchev.
The careers of the two authors in question,
Marshal of the Soviet Union M. V. Zakharov
and General of the Army S. M. Shtemenko,
were both connected closely with the Soviet
General Staff. In addition, they had the
advantage of writing their recollections while
still serving on it. The result, one suspects, is

The author, left, shown with then General o f the A r m y , M. V. Zakharov in 1958
Zakharov was named Chief o f the Soviet General Staff in 1966.

impeccable documentation from the Archives
of the Ministry of Defense. 1
In addition t o the recollections of Marshal
Zakharov and General Shtemenko, there have
also appeared the memoirs of former Chiefs
of Staff Meretskov and Vasilevskiy, the
valuable 5 0 Let Vooruzhennykh Sil USSR ( 5 0
Years o f the Armed Forces o f the USSR)
which was edited by a commission chaired by
Marshal Zakharov, and Yu. P. Petrov's
Stroitel'stvo Politorganov, Partinynykh i
Komsomol'skikh Organizatsiiy Armii i Flota
(The Structuring o f Political Organs, Party
and Komsomol Organizations o f the Army
and Fleet) which when used in conjunction
with his earlier work,2 provides pieces of

evidence from which a picture of the current
decision and policymaking process may be
assembled.
UNITY OF COMMAND AND
COLLEGIAL LEADERSHIP

Usually, when decisionmaking
arrangements in the Soviet forces are
considered, the opposing concepts of
yedinonachaliye (unity of command) and the
institution of military commissars come to
mind. Military commissars were employed
during the formative period of the Red Army
( 1918-1921) primarily as a means of
controlling the activities of the military
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By the fall of 1942, the quality of Soviet
commanders was judged to have improved to
the point where military commissars were
freed from the previous duties and designated
deputy commanders for political affairs. The
harmful effect of the commissar system on
operations was tacitly admitted:
. . . In the anticipated broad offensive
battles it was extremely important to
ensure the maximum initiative of
commanders, the rapidity of decisions
and flexibility in directing the troops.5

The implication was that the commissar
system reduced initiative, delayed decisions,
and caused inflexible troop leadership.
H o w e v e r , y e d i n o n a c h a l i y e was
reintroduced in 1942 only to units at what
t h e Soviets consider t h e tactical
level-company through corps inclusive. A
collegial form of leadership-the military
council-was retained at the front (Army
Group), army, and military district level.6
General of the Army, S. M. Shtemenko, Chief of the
General Staff, November 1948 - May 1952.
Currently Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact Forces.
"specialists"-officers of the Czarist Army
who volunteered to serve the new Soviet state
but who were suspect because of their class
origins. The commissars were phased out in
the mid-1920s and restored in the 1937-40
period and again in July 1941. Although the
title "military commissar" was the same as
that used during the civil war, Soviet sources
emphasize that the function of the military
commissar during the latter periods was t o
relieve the commander of political duties so
that he could devote full time to military
matters. 3
However, the commissars bore full
responsibility, along with the military
commander, for their unit's execution of its
mission and for its ". . . steadfast readiness t o
fight to the last drop of blood with the
enemies of our Motherland. . . ."4 Under
these circumstances, the commissar was
bound to concern himself with more than
political indoctrination, since a military
blunder by the commander could also cost
the commissar his neck.
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Marshal of the Soviet Union, A. M. Vasilevskiy,
Chief of the General Staff, June 1942 February 1945, March 1946 -November 1948.

Chairman of the Council of People's
Commissars to decide all questions
connected with defense. Besides this,
mobilization organs have been established
in all of our ministries which here and
there have done some significant work. A
special industrial mobilization organ has
been established in the VSNKh [All
Union Council of the National
Economy]. Finally, a special apparatus
has been established in the bowels of
Comrade Krzhizhanovskiy's enterprise-in
Gosplan, which is required to consider
the needs of defense in any planning of
the economy. 10

THE MILITARY COUNCILS

The military council (voyennyy soviet) has
been a traditional form of collegial
decisionmaking in Russian military history.
The famous military council at Fili in 18 12,
at which it was decided to abandon Moscow
to Napoleon, has been described by Tolstoy
in Wa r and Peace. In the Czarist Armed
Forces a military council was generally
assembled on extraordinary occasions. At
other times the councils were used as
consultative bodies.
After the October Revolution, which was
accomplished in part on enthusiasm generated
by the slogan, "All power to the Soviets," it
was appropriate that the Soviet Republic
establish soviets (councils) to direct its Armed
Forces. At front revolutionary military
councils were established for operational and
administrative direction of the forces assigned
to the respective front or field army. A
Supreme Military Council (created on 4
March 19 18) provided overall military
direction to the Soviet forces. In September
1918, the functions of this body were
t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e newly created
Revolutionary Military Council. The Supreme
Military Council was abolished.
When it became evident that a broader
based military effort would be necessary to
defend the Bolshevik regime, a Council of
Workers and Peasants Defense, headed by
Lenin, was formed in November 1918 to deal
with questions of manpower and resources.7
The name of this body was later changed to
the Council of Labor and Defense 8 (STO).
Thus, during the formative stages of the
Soviet military establishment, a tradition was
established of providing two collegial bodies
at the center of the state structure for
directing military affairs. The politburo,
which was represented in both, provided
coordination and held the power of final
decision.9
At the 15th Party Congress in 1928,
Voroshilov explained that the functions of
the STO were still evolving:

The international crises of 1927 and 1928
which spurred the Soviet defense effort were
relatively mild compared to what was to come
during the next decade. Those which came
caused mobilization preparations of a more
intensive nature and on a broader scale, but
the steps taken in 1928 provided the basic
organizational structure for this aspect of
overall defense preparations.
Between 1928 and 1937, modifications to
these organizational arrangements for
directing the Soviet defense effort were tried.
A Defense Commission, formed in the
Council of Ministers in 1934, assumed some
of the functions from the Revolutionary
Military Council. In 1937 this commission
was renamed the Defense Committee and the
Council o f Labor and Defense was
abolished. 11
The Defense Committee, chaired by
Molotov, included Stalin and Voroshilov
among its members.12 During this period it
provided preliminary guidance on defense
policies and made decisions concerning
mobilization. In 1939, according to Marshal
Zakharov, this Committee approved the
annual mobilization plan which contained
provisions broadening the rights and duties of
the military representatives at defense plants.
The mobilization plan also called for broad
consultations with the heads of factories
producing war materials on such topics as
target dates for the delivery of arms and
equipment. 13
T h e Revolutionary Military Council,

. . . First of all STO has begun to meet
regularly under the leadership of the
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abolished in 1934, was succeeded later that
year by a consultative organ which was called
simply "The Military Council." l4 The fact
that the decisions of this Council were subject
to the approval of the Minister of Defense
(Voroshilov) reflects the strong trend toward
centralized decisionmaking characteristic of
the Stalin period.
In 1938, the Military Council was divided
into a Main (Glavnyy) Military Council of the
Red Army and a Main Military Council of the
Navy. The late Marshal Meretskov described
the activities of the Main Military Council of
the Army during the period in 1938 when he,
as Deputy Chief of the General Staff, was also
S e c r e t a r y to the Council. From his
description and examples of matters heard by
the Council given by Zakharov and Zhukov, it
is apparent that the Council played an
important advisory role in the pre-World War
I I decisionmaking process. From the
examples, it is also clear that the Council
considered operational questions primarily,
and that questions of mobilization, supply,
and equipment were matters for the Defense
Committee. The Council, consisting of eight
key leaders of the Ministry of Defense and
chaired by the Minister, met two or three
times a week. At these meetings, reports from
military district commanders or chiefs of the
branches of the service were heard. Each
decision was approved by the Minister and
forwarded to Stalin, in the event the latter
had not been in attendance. Meretskov
comments that this procedure meant that
there was practically no military or military
economic question which was decided
without Stalin's direct participation. 15
Thus, on the eve of the war there were
three bodies charged with directing the
defense effort: the Defense Committee, which
was concerned with broad, overall defense
policy and mobilization of the defense effort;
and the two Main Military Councils (the
Military and the Naval), charged with the
purely military and naval aspects of national
defense. This organizational arrangement was
similar to that which had existed during the
Civil War of 1918-20. When the Soviet Union
became involved in World War II, two similar
bodies were formed: the State Committee of
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Defense and the Stavka of the Supreme
Command. (Stavka is the traditional Russian
word for headquarters, now used only for the
headquarters of the Commander in Chief or
Supreme Commander.) The State Committee
of Defense coordinated the overall war effort,
the Stavka conducted military operations.
The General Staff continued throughout to
perform its executive and planning functions.
THE GENERAL STAFF

Marshal Zakharov, in a general discussion
of the functions of the General Staff, writing
in the present tense, has characterized them as
follows:
Speaking of planning in the military
area, I would like to stress the following
aspect. I am deeply convinced that the
General Staff is not only the body which
issues directives guiding and leading the
Armed Forces, not only the apparatus
conducting analytic and generalizing
activity in the military sphere; it is also a
vigilant eye constantly looking ahead into
the future, not taking its eye off
tendencies in the general development of
military affairs, and also characteristic
deviations and peculiarities, which occur,
or could occur with a probable opponent
on a given question.

All the documentation connected with
the planning of the building of the Soviet
Army and the mobilization of human and
material resources can turn out to be
pointless and not reflect the real defense
requirements of the country if it is not
reinforced by detailedly thought out
scientific calculations and the
considerations of the General Staff for
the strategic deployment of the Soviet
Armed Forces in case a real threat of
attack of the imperialist aggressors on our
country appears.16
Zhukov,17 Shtemenko,18 and the present
Minister of Defense Marshal A. A. Grechko19

have given similar appraisals of the role of the
General Staff in the Soviet military
decisionmaking process.
When seen on an organization chart of the
Ministry of Defense, the General Staff appears
to be an almost insignificant body. Its role in
planning and operations, however, gives it an
importance which far transcends its size. As
both Marshals Zhukov and Zakharov have
observed, the General Staff draws on the
other elements of the Ministry of Defense for
the data which is the basis for its plans. The
mobilization plans must match the availability
of weapons and supplies, and these factors
must be coordinated to the overall plans for
strategic deployments and operations. In
wartime, the General Staff becomes "the
working organ of the Stavka."
During World War I I , day-by-day decisions
at the Stavka were made on the basis of the
reports of the General Staff. These were made
orally, usually by the Chief of Staff or the
acting Chief ( A n t o n o v ) , w h o was
accompanied by the Chief of the Operations
Directorate. Shtemenko provides many
examples t o demonstrate that Stalin
demanded the strictest accuracy in these
reports. Usually at these late night sessions,
some members of the Politburo were present,
as were the members of the
Stavka- Timoshenko, Zhukov, Molotov,
Voroshilov, Budennyy, and N. G. Kuznetsov
who were, in addition to Stalin, named to the
Stavka on 23 June 1941.20 In certain cases,
military specialists such as the chiefs of the
artillery, armored force, or air force, would
attend, would report and give information
concerning their specialties. The composition
of this group varied, depending on Stalin's
desires and on who was in Moscow at the
time. On occasions, when decisions were
being made on forthcoming operations, the
field commanders were called to Moscow to
give their opinions.
The recent accounts which attempt to
provide a more objective view of Stalin's
leadership leave no doubt that he and he
alone directed, on a daily basis, the Soviet
military effort. He did not, however, direct
the war by reference to a globe, as
Khrushchev has reported, but on the basis of

the best and most accurate information he
could obtain. To supplement the flow of
accurate information, he sent his most trusted
aides into the field and authorized the
creation of a corps of General Staff Officers
to provide him with objective information on
the combat situation. The rapid series of
organizational and personnel changes made by
Stalin in the first 18 months of the war
appeared to be without plan and are an
excellent example of the tendency of
dictators, described by Hannah Arendt, to
keep organizations under them in a state of
flux. Eventually, only the leader is secure in
his position, and the men around him begin to
believe that without the leader all is lost.21
Nevertheless, by the end of 1942, Stalin had
shaped, in the General Staff, the institution
he needed if he was to make decisions which
would lead to victory.
THE GENERAL STAFF TRADITION

It appears clear that the General Staff,
having performed such vital functions during
the war and continuing to perform these for
"years"22 afterward, developed on its part an
institutional tradition for accuracy and
execution based on a staff of highly trained
professionals. The Academy of the General
Staff, established in 1936, has continued to
prepare the new generations of staff officers
and senior commanders who are beginning to
replace the well-known Soviet military leaders
of World War II. The maintenance of its
institutional tradition has also been enhanced
by a remarkably small turnover in its
chiefs-only six men held the post between
1945 and 1971.23
For officers trained in the General Staff
tradition, the wartime experiences, the
f r e q u e n t personnel transfers, and the
reorganizations of the high command which
were characteristic of the Stalin period, must
have left a deep and lasting impression.
Reaction to them may have been one of the
reasons for the relatively small number of
personnel and organizational changes which
occurred in the Ministry of Defense after the
death of Stalin. Another manifestation of
General Staff training and tradition was
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Zakharov's r e m a r k , p u b l i s h e d after
Khrushchev's dismissal in October 1964,
decrying "subjectivism" and "harebrained"
schemes. 24
POSTWAR ORGANIZATION

In early 1946, the People's Commissariat of
Defense and Navy was reorganized and
renamed the Ministry of the Armed Forces.
Each Military Service-the Army, Navy, and
Air Force-was placed under a commander in
chief and provided a staff referred to by the
Soviets as a main staff (glavnyy shtab), to
distinguish them from the General Staff. In
addition, a new Service was created-the
National Anti-aircraft Defense-and the Rear
Services, organized as a separate Service
during the war, which continued as a separate
entity. A military council was established in
each Service, and a Supreme Military Council
(Vysshiy Voyennyy Sovet) was established at
the ministerial leve1.25 The General Staff, as
we have noted above, continued to function
as it had during the war. In 1950, when a
separate naval ministry was again formed, a
Main (Glavnyy) Military Council was also
again formed at each ministry, and a Supreme
Military Council was formed in the Council of
Ministers. In 1953, after Stalin's death, the
two ministries were once again combined into
a Ministry of Defense, the name of which has
not changed. The Main Military Councils were
apparently replaced by a combined body.26
After the dismissal of Zhukov from his post
of Minister of Defense in October 1957, one
of the charges leveled against him was that he

General of the Army, V. G. Kulikov, Chief of the
General Staff since September 1971.
armies, and flotillas by achieving their
conversion into consultative organs for
the commanders. He insisted on
liquidating the position of Member of the
Military Council for cadre political
workers, on approving the membership of
military councils not by a decision of the
C[entral] C[ommittee] but by an order
of the Minister of Defense, despite the
fact that in the membership of the
military councils along with the
commander and cadre army party
workers there were members of the
C [entral] C [ommittee] of the
Party-secretaries of Communist Parties
of republics, districts, and regions. He in
every way depreciated the role of
members of the military council and
conducted meetings without them.28

. . . insisted on the liquidation of the
Supreme Military Council-a collective
organ, the membership of which included
members and candidate members of the
Presidium of the C[entral] C[ommittee] ,
military and political leaders of the army
and fleet. . . .27
. . . Zhukov also attempted to limit the
rights of the military councils of the
military districts, groups of forces, fleets,

It is necessary to be very circumspect in
treating the accusations against Zhukov, as
Yu. P. Petrov apparently discovered when, in
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1968, he revised significantly his history of
party organizations in the Armed Forces
(published in 1964) to prepare it for
publication under a slightly different title. In
the 1968 version, most of the significant
accusations against Zhukov were dropped,
including the one that he insisted on
disbanding the Supreme Military Council. The
latest version, in a footnote, states that the
regulation on military councils had been
approved in July 1957-four months before
Zhukov was accused of attempting to
depreciate their role.29 However, both Petrov
versions and the authoritative 50 Years of the
Armed Forces USSR agree that in April 1958
the entire question of the military councils
was reviewed, the responsibility and authority
of the members were broadened, and the
membership of the various councils was fixed
by the Central Committee. The latter step was
taken in order to prevent commanders from
co-opting members to the Council to obtain a
majority on a particular question. Within the
councils, the relative weight of the technical
branches-the Air Force, Tank Troops,
Artillery, and the Rocket Troops-was
increased with the surprising result that
". . . if in the early period of their creation,
and also later at separate stages of Soviet
military construction there were a majority of
political workers on the Council, now the
majority was m a d e up of military
specialists. . . ."3O
However, political
representation included not only a uniformed
political officer, who was to be known as
"Member of the Military Council," but also
the regional Party First Secretary. The latter's
political influence can be assumed to be much
greater than that of the uniformed Council
members.
The regulation on the councils issued in
April 1958 required that questions coming
before them be decided by a majority vote.
The decision thus reached was then obligatory
for all members of the Council and executed
on orders signed by the commander. In event
of disagreement, members could report their
dissenting opinion to the Central Committee,
the Government, or to the Ministry of
Defense.31
As noted above, the Supreme Military
Council was in existence at least until October

1957, when Zhukov's alleged attempt to
disband it was reported. Zhukov's alleged
attack on the Council as an institution would
in itself have been grounds to ensure its
continuance-at least through Khrushchev's
period of ascendency. The Council is
mentioned in T h e Penkovskiy Papers, which
provides information dating from 1961 and
1962. According to these papers, during the
Khrushchev period the Council was directly
u n d e r t h e Presidium of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party and
chaired by Khrushchev or, in his absence, by
Kozlov or Mikoyan. The Minister of Defense
and the commanders in chief of the Services
were automatically members of the Council,
while a few members of the Presidium were
always in attendance.32
A work published in 1967 and reissued in
1969 refers to the presence of a "Main
(Glavnyy) Military Council" in the
c o n t e m p o r a r y military decisionmaking
process.33 Since, as we have seen, the Military
Council at the ministerial level was referred to
as a "main" Military Council only when the
military and naval ministries were separate
(from 1938-41 and from 1950-53), this
reference may be in error. It does establish,
however, that along with the Military
Councils at the higher command echelons, a
similar council continues to exist at the
highest level in the Soviet Ministry of
Defense. The decisionmaking process is
summed up as follows:
There are organs of collective
leadership also directly in the Armed
Forces in the form of the Main Military
Council, Military Councils of the Services
(vidy) of the Armed Forces, military
districts, groups of forces, and fleets.
Military Councils collectively consider
and decide all of the most important
questions in the life and activity of the
troops. The resolutions of the Military
Councils are realized by orders of the
commanders which ensures the consistent
accomplishment of the principle of
unified command (edinonachaliye) in the
operational and strategic echelon of
military direction.34
Since Zhukov's dismissal, military policies
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have been set by a collegial leadership which
includes, at levels as low as the field army,
local civilian Party representation in addition
to the participation of the political officer,
who is a Party worker in uniform. At the
highest level, which now may be called the
M a i n Military Council, t h e Party
representation may be the General Secretary
of the Party and/or other members of the
Politburo. The decisions of this Council are in
turn reviewed in the Politburo itself, an
exclusively civilian organization since the fall
of Zhukov (the only professional military
officer ever to have membership in that
body), before they are sent to the
Government and become Party-Government
decisions. The result of Party participation at
an early level in the decisionmaking process
may tend to inhibit the free flow of ideas
upward, but this participation ensures an
integrated military-political policy.
It is also logical to assume that there exists
within the Council of Ministers a State
Committee on Defense to provide the overall
policy guidance to the Minister of Defense.
The ministers of defense-related industries 35
probably sit on this committee to provide
industrial and economic advice and
coordination for defense mobilization
policies. Although there has been no public
mention of the existence of such a committee
since the end of World War II, there is an
abundance of inferential evidence of its
activities.
That the general framework of the Soviet
decisionmaking process has not changed
significantly from that outlined above is also
confirmed in a monograph by Colonel M. P.
Skirdo, published in 1970 by Voyenizdat, the
publishing house of the Ministry of Defense.
Colonel Skirdo also confirms that the
principles of Party c o n t r o l and collective
leadership in the Armed Forces remain in
effect. He writes as follows:
The direct leadership of the armed
forces in peace time as well as war time is
accomplished by the supreme command,
the general staff and the corresponding
military leaders. Their many-sided
activity we call the military leadership. It
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is accomplished in accordance with the
general directives of the supreme state
political organ.36

In conditions of nuclear rocket war, collective
leadership, according to Skirdo, has become
an objective necessity caused by the
continuous increase in the number and
complexity of nuclear weapons in the hands
of troops. Other factors which must be kept
in mind are the enormous distances over
which a modern war will be fought and the
numbers of people who will be drawn into it.
In the short period of time which will be
available to receive, collate, and analyze
incoming information concerning the combat
situation, it will only be possible to reach a
decision and to issue the necessary orders,
according to Skirdo, if there is available a
collective organ to direct the war. This organ
will depend on the General Staff to collect
and analyze the information and disseminate
the orders once a decision has been
reached.37
The possibility of nuclear rocket war has in
Skirdo's view increased the role of the
political leadership for six main reasons:
1. Only the political leadership can decide
if there will be or will not be a thermonuclear
war;
2. Only the political leadership can define
the necessity to use means of mass
destruction and determine the basic targets
and when they will be attacked;
3. Because such a war will be a coalition
war, there will have to be a unified political
leadership of the coalition, a task which can
only be performed by an authoritative,
powerful, and flexible political leadership.
4. To withstand such a war only a state
which can make maximum effective use of all
its military, economic, and moral-political
resources from the beginning of the war will
be successful. This will require an
experienced, sagacious political leadership.
5. The ability to discover in a timely
fashion the direct preparations of an aggressor
to attack, to anticipate his plans, and to make
t h e decision to deliver a destructive
retaliatory strike, will depend on the political
leadership to a large degree.

6. In the course of a world nuclear rocket
war, the political leadership will have to
decide problems of complexity and scope
unknown to previous history. These problems
will have to be decided under contemporary
conditions by other methods and in other
periods of time than in the past.38
The political leadership will also have to
define the war aims in a clear and convincing
fashion to convince the masses of the
population that they are worth fighting for.
At the same time, these aims must be
compatible with the forces and means
available to the country and the coalition of
which it is part. The political leadership is
responsible before the war to develop a
military doctrine which takes into account
the character of a future war, the forces and
capabilities of the opposing sides, and the
contemporary level of military affairs. The
political leadership must also strengthen the
economic might of the country-in particular,
its defense industry.
Problems connected with civil defense,
according to Skirdo, will be incomparably
greater than those connected with antiaircraft
defense in the last war. In addition to
organizing and executing civil defense
measures, the political leadership will be
responsible for the general preparation of the
population for war, a preparation which will
include not only participation in civil defense
activities and military training, but also the
preparation of the population in morale,
political, and a psychological sense.39
These powerful arguments for political
control of the decisionmaking process have
been echoed to varying degrees by the senior
Soviet military leaders. Marshal Grechko, the
current Minister of Defense, has written that:
The relationship i n contemporary war
of politics and strategy, of the political
and the strictly military leadership, of
collegial and one man command-all of
these questions the Party will decide on
the basis of Leninist ideas of defending
the country.40
THE CURRENT MILITARY DECISION AND
POLICYMAKING PROCESS

For the Soviet military high command, the

continual changes in command and i n
organization of the Stalin period and the
schemes of Khrushchev have almost certainly
reinforced their traditional conservatism. For
the Soviet military, the dangers and tensions
of the nuclear age and the possible irrevocable
results of a badly considered military move in
the era of the ICBM demand continuity,
broad and d e e p examination of all
alternatives, and a systematic decisionmaking
process.
There is evidence that something close to
this ideal has been achieved in recent years.
The remarkably slow turnover in the high
command is one evidence of this; another is
the stability of the organizational structure of
the high command; and finally there is the
evidence which can be derived from the
orderly response of the senior military
planning organs to policy variations associated
w i t h post-Stalin changes in political
leadership. The strategic buildup has
proceeded steadily; the development of the
Soviet surface and undersea navy has
p r o g r e s s e d b o t h qualitatively a n d
quantitatively; the reinforcement of the
Chinese border has proceeded gradually; the
Arabs were rearmed quickly, almost as if the
Soviets anticipated the results of the six-day
war; the invasion of Czechoslovakia was
carefully, almost ponderously, prepared and
executed.
The military policies for the next few years
which were ratified by the 24th Party
Congress evolved as a result of collective
consideration of recommendations from the
Army level through the Supreme Military
Council, and at each level the Party was
represented, not only by the uniformed
political officer, but also by the regional Party
Secretary. The final decision on all matters
was made in the Politburo: recommendations
on matters of strategy, deployments, force
structures, and weapons characteristics were
m a d e by the Main Military Council;
recommendations on military-economic
matters were made by the State Defense
Committee; and the General Staff collected,
analyzed and presented the necessary data to
support the requests. The Politburo, during its
deliberations, had the prerogative of calling
for such further military and civilian expertise
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